Raúl Castro plots his endgame

Posted on Saturday, 04.27.13



Raúl Castro plots his endgame

By JOSÉ AZEL

jazel@miami.edu



The succession from Fidel to Raúl Castro, programmed since the early

days of the Cuban revolution, was efficient, effective and seamless.

Gen. Castro now is orchestrating his own succession, but this one lacks

the historical legitimizing elements of the 1959 revolution.



The recent appointment of Miguel Diaz-Canel, a 52-year-old party

apparatchik factotum, as first vice president of the Council of State

places him in line to succeed Raúl Castro in that state body. This,

however, is not equivalent to being No. 2 in the regime as the

international media seem to have concluded.



Article 5 of the Cuban constitution makes it clear that the Communist

Party is "the superior leading force of the society and the state." The

15-member Politburo of the Communist Party remains headed by Raúl Castro

as first secretary, and by 82-year-old Machado Ventura as second secretary.



It is not often understood that Raúl Castro leads Cuba not because he is

president of the Council of State, but because he is first secretary of

the Communist Party and Fidel's brother. Under the Cuban governing

succession scheme, the military-dominated Politburo would recommend

Cuba's next leader.



The succession plot thickens when we consider that constitutionally, the

president of the Council of State is also the supreme chief of the

Revolutionary Armed Forces. Cuban history offers no tradition of

military subordination to civilian rule. With Raúl Castro gone, it is

difficult to envision old comandantes like Ramiro Valdes and three-star

generals of the Politburo obediently offering military allegiance and

saluting in subordination to a civilian bureaucrat like Diaz-Canel. This

comportment of unchallenged civilian command of the armed forces is not

in the Cuban memes (cultural genes).



When thinking about change in Cuba, it is essential to keep in mind that

Cuba's history for the past half century is that of the Castro brothers

and their ideas. Raúl Castro's inner circle is not made up of closet

democrats waiting for an opportune moment to put into practice their

long-suppressed Jeffersonian ideals. Their governing modality is

ontologically inseparable from their ideology. In a symbiotic

relationship, authoritarianism engenders a corrupt oligarchy, and that

oligarchy profits from the continuation of corrupt authoritarianism.



Behind the Diaz-Canel designation — let's make sure we do not label it

an election — is a venal plot of political maquillage.



The role of the Cuban military in the economy is extensive and

pervasive, with the military managerial elite controlling over 60

percent of the economy. Therefore, from a longer-term strategic

perspective the critical question is: What follows when the Raúl era

comes to an end, leaving the generals in control of both the Politburo

and the economy?



When enterprises are state-owned and managed, the

military-officers-turned-business-executives enjoy the privileges of an

elite ruling class. Their standard of living is higher, they move into

better homes, etc. But these benefits are minuscule when compared with

the opportunities to gain significant wealth by owning the enterprises

under their control. The military elite understands that managing

government-owned enterprises offers only limited benefits — owning the

enterprises is far more lucrative.



In the years to come, the military elite will be highly motivated to

arrange a manipulated privatization of the economy in order to monetize

their positions. Alas, this corrupt mockery of privatization ends with

the generals and colonels as the new Cuban "captains of industry."



This, however, requires support from the international investment

community, and for that, the Cuban leadership must appear willing to

make changes in the political realm. Enter the Diaz-Canel designation.

Surely, he is a capable, obedient and disciplined party loyalist and

fully aware of the dire fate of those civilians who preceded him in

prominent positions when their loyalty was questioned e.g., Aldana,

Lage, Robaina, Perez Roque.



In the Cuban governing madhouse, Gen. Castro is seeking regime

continuity presenting a façade of political lawfulness that will enable

his generals and family to monetize their loyalty. The military will

oversee a hegemonic party system offering a patina of political

legitimacy for the benefit of the international community.



It is not important who fills the civilian poster-face roles. After all,

Roman Emperor Caligula, in his insanity or perversion, sought to make

his favorite horse into a Roman consul to show that a horse could

perform a senator's duties.



José Azel is a senior scholar at the Institute for Cuban and

Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami, and the author of the book,

"Mañana in Cuba."



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