A Post-Castro Era Looms For Cuba

Published on April 20, 2013

A Post-Castro Era Looms For Cuba – OpEd

By FPIF

By Arturo Lopez-Levy



With a post-Castro Era looming on the horizon, the Obama administration

should muster the political will to prepare the United States for

February 2018, when neither Fidel nor Raul Castro will remain at the

helm of the Cuban state.



In 1960, when Cuba's new first vice president Miguel Diaz-Canel was

born, Fidel Castro had already been leading Cuba for a year. Neither the

Beatles nor the Rolling Stones had conquered rock-n-roll. Dwight D.

Eisenhower ruled the United States, becoming the first of eleven United

States presidents, including Obama, to apply the failed embargo policy

against the Castro regime and the political project it represents.



But against the calendar, there are no victories. In 2006, Fidel

Castro's illness forced the first transition in the Cuban leadership

since 1959. Raúl, then aged 76, replaced Fidel, who was almost 80.

Despite the fact that it was a succession between brothers of the same

generation, the presidency of Raúl Castro has had important consequences

for politics and the Cuban economy. Faced with the loss of Fidel's

charismatic leadership, the Cuban Communist Party began processes of

economic reform and political liberalization in order to rebuild its

capacity to govern under the new conditions.



In the last five years, the Cuban government has created an important

institutional foundation for the transition to a mixed economy,

symbolized by the encouragement of non-state sector firms, and a

post-totalitarian relationship between the state and civil society,

symbolized by relaxed travel restrictions. With the election of the new

Council of State on February 24th, the last phase of the transition to

the post-Castro era began. Raúl Castro was reelected president, but for

the first time a leader born after 1959, Miguel Diaz-Canel, became the

second in command. Although this transition is unfolding with the same

party and president in power, and is both gradual and limited, a new

leadership and changing priorities are discernible.



If we think of the Communist Party as a corporation (an analogy that

should not be abused), Diaz-Canel is a manager who, over time, has

served at various levels of its production chain. He worked at its

foundation, as a university teacher and youth leader. Later, in the

strategic provinces of Villa Clara and Holguin, he administered the

implementation of economic reforms and directed the opening of the

economy to foreign investment and tourism, all the while maintaining

party control over both processes.



Díaz-Canel is part of the network of provincial party czars who are very

important in the implementation of the proposed changes, particularly

decentralization. Having worked in central and eastern Cuba, the new

first vice president has cordial ties with regional commanders of the

armed forces, which, along with the Communist Party, is the other pillar

of the current Cuban system. He is a civilian, the first in the line of

succession to have little military experience. But he is steeped in the

networks of power and well versed in the controlled management of reforms.

Challenges for Cuban and United States leaders



If Cuba implements the type of mixed economy proposed by the last

Congress of the Communist Party and establishes a new, more vital

relationship with its diaspora and the world, it will also transform

politically. With the economy and society changing, the political

environment cannot remain intact. The rise of market mechanisms and an

autonomous non-state sector will reinforce the new pluralizing flows of

information, investment, and technology. The new social sectors will

seek representation in the political arena. Citizens will have greater

access to the Internet, from which civil society will benefit.



This does not imply a transition to multiparty democracy over the next

five years. But even without regime change, economic liberalization will

force an expansion of pluralism within the current People's Power

system. Candidates for local elections could come from the new non-state

sectors, or previously unrepresented religious or social groups, and

demand a transparent use of local taxes. Pressures for systemic

political changes could increase as the economy adopts more

market-oriented structures and more Cubans are able to travel abroad.

Then the party system could be reformed in order to remain at the helm

of social and economic changes.



Political liberalization will probably start at the lower levels of

government, allowing citizens to vent their frustrations at that scale.

However, the pressure is sure to rise. Raul Castro's decision to limit

political office holders to two five-year terms, at a time when the

older generation is leaving power by attrition, will result in a less

personalized and more institutionalized leadership that promotes upward

mobility of new politicians in an orderly fashion. The central challenge

facing Cuban leaders is to have the audacity, creativity, and

self-confidence to accelerate economic reforms, without losing control

of the ongoing political liberalization.



In this new context, the U.S challenge is to open a path for those in

the regime who have an interest in backing more serious reforms. The

United States should discredit the naysayers within the Cuban elite (and

Washington's as well) by showing what Cuba can gain through opening up

its politics and society, rather than maintaining excessive controls.

This requires a U.S. readiness to present Havana with real incentives in

ways the United States has not done since the times of the Ford and

Carter administrations.



Washington's current strategy—ignoring Raul Castro's pro-market moves

and using USAID programs to meddle in Cuba's domestic politics and

promote regime change—is yielding diminishing returns. The United States

has more to gain by allowing its own business community to trade and

invest in the emerging Cuban non-state sector and engaging the new

leaders in Havana. A dynamic Cuban market that appeals to U.S. investors

would put the U.S. embargo against the island in jeopardy.



The opportunity to redesign U.S. policy towards Cuba will not last

forever. A failure to respond to Raúl Castro's overtures for negotiation

with Washington would be a strategic mistake. Unfortunately, the 1996

Helms-Burton law codified the embargo as a legislative act and limited

presidential authority to terminate sanctions in response to Cuba's

changing conditions. But President Obama still can make a significant

difference in bilateral relations if he decides to lead on the issue by

using his prerogatives as diplomat in chief.



The president can begin by taking Cuba off the State Department's list

of "state sponsors of terrorism." It would be a positive gesture towards

Havana and signal to the world that Obama meant what he said when he

called for a new diplomatic approach towards American adversaries. It

would not be a concession to Cuba, since Havana has not been connected

to any terrorist actions for at least 20 years. The misuse of the list

to serve a petty political agenda of the pro-embargo lobby delegitimizes

its credibility as a useful tool of the United States against real

terrorist threats.



Taking Cuba off the State Department's list would also provide a

framework for resolving the Alan Gross affair. This problem is currently

intractable because of the false premise in Washington that Gross is a

hostage of a terrorism-sponsoring nation. The issue might become

manageable if the two countries could negotiate a comprehensible package

that would save face for both governments. Such an agreement could be

the first step to stabilize a course of engagement and broad

people-to-people contacts over the next four years—a critical goal, if

the U.S. is to have some influence during the final transition to a

post-Castro Cuba.



Arturo Lopez-Levy is a PhD Candidate at the Josef Korbel School of

International Studies of the University of Denver. You can follow him on

Twitter @turylevy.



http://www.eurasiareview.com/20042013-a-post-castro-era-looms-for-cuba-oped/