lunes, 19 de noviembre de 2012

An Assessment of the Cuban Government’s Management Over the Last Six Years

An Assessment of the Cuban Government's Management Over the Last Six

Years / Dimas Castellano

Dimas Castellanos, Translator: Unstated



Four decades after taking power through revolution in 1959, the factors

which made totalitarianism in Cuba possible have reached their limit.

The populist measures imposed during the first years after the

revolution were accompanied by the dismantling of civil society and a

process of government takeover which began with foreign-owned companies

and did not end until the last 56,000 small service-related and

manufacturing businesses, which had managed to survive until 1968, were

eliminated.



The efforts to subordinate individual and group interests to those of

the state has led to disaster. The confluence of the breakdown of the

current economic and political model, national stagnation, citizen

discontent, external isolation and the absence of alternative forces

capable of having an impact on these issueshave created conditions for

change. On the one hand this has led to despair, apathy, endemic

corruption and mass exodus, while on the other hand there has been an

emergence of new social and political figures.



It was in this context that the provisional transfer of power from the

Leader of the Revolution took place. The fact that this transfer was

carried out by the same forces that led the country into crisis meant

that the order, depth and pace of change were determined by the power

structure itself, which explains the effort to change the appearance of

the system while preserving its character – an unresolvable

contradiction – doomed governmental efforts from the start. This

process, now in-progress, has passed through three phases led by Army

General Raúl Castro.



Phase One



On July 31, 2006, as a result of illness, the First Secretary of the

Cuban Communist Party (PCC), President of the Council of State and

Council of Ministers, and Commander-in Chief, Fidel Castro, divided his

multiple responsibilities and temporarily transferred them to seven

party and government leaders.Raúl Castro was named First Secretary of

the PCC, Commander-in-Chief and President of the Council of State.José

Ramón Balaguer Cabrera was tapped to head the National and International

Program on Health.Ramón Machado Ventura and Esteban Lazo Hernández were

named to the National and International Education Program, and Carlos

Lage Dávila became the driving force behind the National Program for an

Energy Revolution. The programs for Health, Education and Energy were to

be led respectively byCarlos Lage, Francisco Soberón (President of the

Central Bank of Cuba), and Felipe Pérez Roque. These appointments marked

the beginning ofRaúl's administration.



In discussions, interviews and statements the new leader spoke of the

need for change, including a willingness to normalize relations with the

United States – an idea he expressed in an interview published

inGranmaon August 18, and which he reiterated on December 2 of that year

in the Plaza of the Revolution. Without blaming his predecessor,Raúl

began discarding previous methods and plans. Military marches, secret

trials and other politically motivated actions which made up the Battle

of Ideas disappeared while strong criticisms were leveled at the

inefficient agricultural production industry.



In the same vein, on July 11, 2007 the National Assembly of People's

Power (ANPP) raised the idea that "Each province should have its own

builders, should have its own teachers, should have its own police… " It

criticized the bloated labor force (an artificial means of "reducing"

unemployment to almost zero in order to demonstrate the superiority of

the Cuban system). It called on retired teachers and professors to

return to the classroom. It announced the elimination of improper free

services and excessive subsidies. It set out to reverse the trend

towards a reduction in the area of land under cultivation, which had

decreased by 33% in the years between 1998 and 2007. Later, on July 27,

2007 inCamagey, he spoke of the need to introduce structural and

conceptual changes. He emphasized the vital importance of manufacturing

products in Cuba which are now purchased from overseas, and acknowledged

that huge tracts of land are now overrun by the marabou weed.



Subsequently, he initiated the sale of computers, DVD's, electronic

equipment and access to mobile phones. He allowed Cubans to book hotel

rooms reserved for tourists and to rent automobiles using hard currency.

The licensing of private food vendors was expanded. Workers dining halls

were closed. Cars, barber shops with up to three chairs and small beauty

salons were rented out to workers. Regulations on the construction and

repair of homes were relaxed, and the sale of fruits and vegetables from

pushcarts was allowed.



Most striking was Decree/Law 259, which covered the leasing of idle

land. It was an important but insufficient and contradictory measure.

While it acknowledged that food production was a serious national

security concern andrecognized the inability of the state to produce it,

the law allowed the state to retain ownership of the land, thus reducing

efficient producers to lessees.



Phase Two



As a result of Fidel'sdeteriorating health, the "Message from the

Commander-in-Chief" was published on February 19, 2008 in which he

permanently gave up his numerous positions. Five days later, on February

24, the ANPP electedRaúl Castro President of the Council of State,

marking the second phase of his administration, which gave rise to a

period of conjecture, desire, aspiration and hope.



The fragmentation of power that Fidel Castro had decreed in June 2006

was no longer in effect.Lage and Pérez Roque left the PCC, while the

others quit their positions and assumed others in the new government.

Among these wereJosé Ramón Machado Ventura, who became Second Secretary

of the PCC and Vice-President of the Council of State, and Esteban Lazo,

who kept his position as member of the Politburo.



This second phase began with the introduction of a series of measures

that could be classified as a basic reform plan. It was limited to

certain sectors of the economy and its goals could be outlined as

follows: 1) To achieve a strong and effective agricultural sector

capable of feeding the population and replacing imports, 2) to make

people aware of the need to work in order to survive, 3) to firmly

reject illegalities and other manifestations of corruption, 4) to reduce

the state workforce, whose redundant job positions exceed one million

workers, and 5) to jump start self-employment.



In the second half of 2011 various decrees and resolutions were issued

authorizing the private sale of automobiles, the buying, selling,

exchange and donation of homes, a relaxation in rules governing rentals,

and the commercialization of agricultural production in the tourism

industry. The credit policy was expanded to cover self-employed workers

and small farmers, and restrictions on emigration from the countryside

to Havana were relaxed.



Among other factors, this basic program of reform was limited by a kind

of power sharing arrangement in which the new leader agreed to consult

with Fidel on major decisions and the latter provided indirect criticism

in the form published reflections and public statements. The most

critical point in this duality came in the middle of 2011 when the

leader of the revolution reappeared in public. On July 11 he appeared at

the National Center for Scientific Research and on July 13 at the Center

for World Economic Research, where he ordered that an urgent

investigation into the post-war era be carried out. On July 15 he

appeared at the National Aquarium and on July 16 at the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, where he met with Cuba's overseas ambassadors. On July

25 he appeared in Artemesia on the eve of the anniversary of the assault

on the Moncada Barracks, dressed in military fatigues. On the following

day, July 26, he celebrated the commemoration with artists,

intellectuals, members of Pastors for Peace and other invited guests.



Finally, on Saturday, August 7, at an extraordinary session of the ANPP,

Fidel appeared to once again express his concerns about eminent nuclear

war and relations with the United States. In his address he asserted

that the world would be saved if it accepted the logical arguments he

was espousing. Referring to President Obama, he said, "Perhaps he will

not give the order if we can persuade him."



In the midst of these activities, in a regular session of the ANPPon

August 1,Raúl Castro announced the expansion of self-employment along

with a reduction in the state labor force – something unprecedented in

Cuba. On August 13 the release of six political prisoners was announced.

These two events revealed two contradictions that could suggest a

failure of government.



What is significant about this second phase ofRaúlCastro's

administration is that the measures, which were introduced in an

unfavorable national and international economic environment and which no

country could sustain indefinitely, made it impossible to return to the

stagnation of the past.



Phase Three



At the Sixth Party Congress and the First National Conference of the

PCC, which took place in April 2011 and January 2012 respectively, were

defining events for change.



In a report to the Sixth Party Congress,Raúl argued that self-employment

should become a facilitating factor for the building socialism in Cuba

by allowing the state to concentrate on raising the level of efficiency

of the primary means of production, thus permitting the state to

extricate itself from the administration of activities which were not of

strategic importance to the country. At the session he explained that

updating the current economic model would take place gradually over the

course of five years. He acknowledged that, in spite of Law/Decree 259,

there were still thousands and thousands of hectares of idle land. He

called on the Communist party to change its way of thinking about

certain dogmas and outdated views, which had constrained it for many

years, and declared that his primary mission and purpose in life was to

defend, preserve and continue perfecting socialism.



The outlines of a basic reform plan, approved by acclamation at the

party conclave, were codified in the Political and Social Guidelines,

but constrained by the socialist system of planning which viewed

state-run enterprise as the primary driving force of the economy.



Several days after the Sixth Party Congress had agreed to separate

political from administrative functions, Machado Ventura began

reiterating the following ideas at the fifteen provincial conferences of

the PCC: "The party does not administer. That is fine, but it cannot

lose control over its activists, no matter what positions they may

occupy… We have to know beforehand what each producer will sow and what

he will harvest… We must demand this of those who work the land." These

were arguments intended to keep the economy under the control of the

party and to hamper the interests of producers.



It was in this context that, in the thirty days between Thursday, May 10

and Saturday, June 9 of 2012, Fidel Castro published four essays.

Between June 11 and June 18 he then published eight short pieces – each

forty-three words on average – onErich Honecker, Teófilo Stevenson,

Alberto Juantorena, Deng Xiaoping, poems about Che Guevaraby Nicolás

Guillén, the moringa plant, yoga and the expansion of the universe.

Nebulous messages with no relationship to each other and divorced from

our everyday reality. Since then there have been no more such writings,

and their disappearance seems to have marked the end of the period of

power sharing. Only now and not before are we able to talk aboutRaúl's

administration.



At a meeting of the Ninth Regular Period of Sessions of the ANPP in

July, 2012, after Fidel's essays had already been published,Raúl Castro

returned to proposals he discussed in his report to the Sixth Party

Congress, such as the increase in the amount of idle land. On July 26 in

Guantanamo he once again took up the theme of relations with the United

States. And on July 30 he led the Martyr's Day march in Santiago de

Cuba, which seemed to confirm that he had entered the third phase of his

administration.



Results of the Three Phases



In spite of efforts to achieve a strong and efficient agricultural

sector capable of providing Cubans with enough to eat,agricultural

production fell 4.2% in 2010. GDP in 2011 grew less than expected. Food

imports rose from 1.5 billion in 2010 to 1.7 billion in 2011. Retail

sales fell 19.4% in 2010 while prices rose 19.8%. On the other hand the

median monthly salary rose only 2.2%, a factor which made things worse

for the average Cuban just at the moment that changes began to be

introduced. The 2011-2012 sugar harvest, officially slated to produce

1.45 million tons, had the same disappointing results as in the past in

spite of being able to count on sufficient raw material, as well as 98%

of the resources allocated to this effort. It neither met its target nor

was completed on time.



The proposal to make people realize they need to work in order to

survive, an issue closely associated with illegalities and other forms

of corruption, has gone nowhere. On the contrary, criminal activity has

increased to such a degree, as evidenced by the number of legal

proceedings that have either been held or are ongoing, that corruption,

along with economic inefficiency, now threaten national security. The

government's response, which has been limited to repression, vigilance

and control, has not been successful. Even the official state media has

reflected in recent years on the continual instances of price fixing,

diversion of resources, theft and robbery carried out daily by thousands

and thousands of Cubans, including high-ranking officials who are now

being tried in court. Nevertheless, the problem persists.



In regards to shrinking the state's labor force, the limitations imposed

on self-employment have prevented this sector from absorbing the

projected number of state workers. Of the 374,000 self-employed workers,

more than 300,000 are people who were either already unemployed or

retired. Besides being unconstitutional–the constitution stipulates that

ownership of the means of production by individuals or families cannot

be used to generate income through the exploitation of outside

workers–self-employment has absorbed less than 20% of state workers. The

assumption that this measure would absorb layoffs from the bloated state

labor force byallowing the state to focus on raising the level of

efficiency of the fundamental means of production and permitting the

state to extricate itself from the administration of activities not of

strategic importance to the country have not yielded the expected results.



The implementation of the new measures which have been announced–among

them, an income tax exemption through 2012 for businesses with as many

as five employees, an increase in tax exemption of up to 10,000 pesos of

income, a 5% bonus for early filing of income tax returns, the creation

of new cooperatives and a new law which will relieve the tax burden on

the private sector of the economy–will not resolve the crisis either.



The Real Causes



To deal with a profound structural crisis like Cuba's, changes must be

structural in nature. With the passage of time it has been shown that

small changes in some aspects of the economy must be extended to include

coexistence of various forms of property, including private property,

the formation of small and medium-sized businesses, and the

establishment of rights and freedoms for citizens. Proposals which try

to preserve the failed socialist system of planning as the principal

route for the direction of the economy, and the refusal to accept that

diverse forms of ownership should play their proper roles mean that the

economy–the starting point for any initiative–will remain subject to

party and ideological interests, while citizen participation will be

notable by its absence.



The failure of the totalitarian model has forced the Cuban government to

belatedly opt for reforms that have already been introduced by Cubans

operating on the fringes of the law. Updating the model has been more an

acknowledgement of the existing reality than an introduction of measures

arising out of a real desire for change.



The First Cuban Communist Party Conferencedefinitivelydemonstrated the

infeasibility of the current model and the inability of its leaders to

sever the ideological attachments preventing it from moving forward.

Their refusal to consider citizen's rights shut off any possibility of

change. The delays in relaxing restrictions on emigration, democratizing

the internet and reincorporating into Cuban law the rights and freedoms

outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on

Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on Economic, Social and

Cultural Rights are the principal causes for this failure.



Additionally, it must be added that time is running out. Now, with

little time left, there is talk of going slowly and steadily, which

clearly suggests a decision to not change anything that might threaten

the grip on power.



Independently of the obstacles that have hampered General Raul Castro in

the three phases of his administration, the decisive factor has been the

infeasibility of the current model. Even if his management of the

government had been carried out under the best possible conditions for

implementing reform, it still would have failed due to a lack of freedom

– something which is a prerequisite for modernity – and the lack of a

high degree of political will to forge a new national consensus. Without

these it is impossible to wrest Cuba out of the profound crisis in which

it is immersed. The abilities and intelligence of one man or of his

governing team, no matter how high they might be, are not enough to

overcome the current situation. That is both the reality and the challenge.



Originally published inhttp://convivenciacuba.es/content/view/842/58/



November 5 2012



http://translatingcuba.com/an-assessment-of-the-cuban-governments-management-over-the-last-six-years-dimas-castellano/

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