If the Model Isn’t Working, What Hope Is There for the Copy?

If the Model Isn't Working, What Hope Is There for the Copy? / Dimas

Castellanos

Posted on July 17, 2013



In the second half of the 18th century Creole capabilities along with

the effects of the English occupation of Havana and the Haitian

revolution created favorable conditions for turning Cuba into a sugar

powerhouse. Land owners understood the importance of rapidly developing

the island's agriculture before Haiti could recover. It was necessary to

look to the neighboring island not only with compassion, said Francisco

de Arango y Parreño, but also through political eyes. As a result Cuba

became the main producer and exporter of sugar in the world.



Sugar production, which in 1860 was 447,000 tons, had reached 1,400,000

by 1895. In 1919 it exceeded 4,000,000. In 1925 it reached 5,300,000; in

1952 it was 7,200,000. In 1970, after a colossal effort that disrupted

the entire Cuban economy, 8,500,000 tons were produced. After that, it

began to decrease to the point that in 2001 it was no more than

3,500,000, a figure lower than that of 1919.



To reverse the decline General Ulises Rosales del Toro was appointed to

head the Ministry of Sugar (MINAZ). The Sugar Industry Restructuring

initiative and the Álvaro Reynoso Project were also implemented. The

goal of the former was to achieve 11% output (to extract 11 tons of

sugar for every 100 tons of sugar cane); the goal of the latter was to

produce 54 tons of cane per hectare (according to the UN's Food and

Agriculture Organization the world average was 63 tons).



The results of both projects led to 2.2 million tons being produced in

2002, 2.1 million in 2003, 2.52 in 2004 and 1.3 million in 2005 (a 40%

decrease from the previous year). Results for 2006 and 2007 were similar

to 2005. 2009 saw a slight increase to 1.4 million tons (the same as in

1895). The figures hit a low point in 2010 when only 1.1 million tons

were produced. The annual average over ten years has barely topped 1.8

million tons. The harvest in 2011 remained below 1.3 million tons.



In response to its failures, MINAZ was replaced by the state sugar

monopoly AZCUBA. With the two major factors that led to significantly

reduced production on everyone's minds, the organization made sure to

plant enough cane and at the outset managed to secure almost all the

necessary resources it had contracted for the 2012 harvest.

Nevertheless, it was still only able to fulfill a target of 1,450,000

tons, and even then it did not meet its target date. Finally, in

December 2012 — the beginning of the current harvest — AZCUBA decided to

pool its accumulated knowledge and proposed a production quota of 1.7

million tons of sugar (20% higher than the previous harvest). It also

announced that a majority of its factories would close before May to

avoid the negative effects from that month's heat and rain, factors

which reduce the quality of sugarcane.

Difficulties quickly mounted. By the beginning of February there was a

production delay of 7.8%. By the middle of March the state-run press

noted that most of the thirteen sugar producing provinces would have to

continue refining operations past the target date in order to be able to

produce 1.7 million tons. By the end of March production delays had

reached 18%. At the beginning of April the country was refining at 65%

of its normal capacity due to a shortage of sugarcane. Cienfuegos and

Artemisa provinces have reached approximately 90% of their goals.

Matanzas has a shortfall of 30,000 tons while Villa Clara, Santiago de

Cuba, Holguín, Las Tunas, Granma and Mayabeque are milling at 60% of

normal capacity. At the end of May it was discovered that Camagüey, one

of the provinces that had hoped to fulfill its quota, was lagging

behind. Now, in late June, the end of the current harvest has still not

been announced.

Results from the Uruguay central sugar refinery in Sancti Spiritus

province, which for the last six years has fulfilled its technical

economic quota, produced 8,000 tons more than the previous year and

achieved an 11.95% rate of gross economic output, the highest in the

country.



In summation, a change of management, the Sugar Industry Restructuring

initiative, the Álvaro Reynoso Project, the closure of some one-hundred

sugar factories, the reallocation of a large percentage of fields

reserved for sugar cultivation to other crops, the replacement of MINAZ

with AZCUBA and a varied package of economic and structural measures

have not been sufficient to raise the per-hectare production of

sugarcane or planned industrial output.



The 2013 harvest suffers from the same problems as those that preceded

it: late starts, sugarcane shortages, low agricultural and industrial

output, transportation problems, inadequate maintenance, industry-wide

breakdowns, poor repairs to agricultural equipment, aging raw material,

lack of spare parts, poorly trained personnel, administrative

incompetence and high per-ton production costs, among other factors.



Although twenty years is nothing according to the popular tango anthem

by Carlos Gardel and Alfredo Lepera*, in economic terms it is long

enough to know it is time to get rid the current model. Whether

discussing the obsolete or the updated version, it simply does not and

cannot work. This is because economic issues remain subordinate to

ideology. State ownership of property predominates and the system of

economic planning has no relationship to reality, having been copied

from the Soviet model. The situation is similar to that of Cuba at the

end of the 18th century when solutions imposed by Spain were no longer

appropriate given the changes that had occurred on the island. Francisco

de Arango y Parreño summed it up nicely when he said, "If the model no

longer works, what hope is there for the copy?"



Havana, June 3, 2013



1 Ponte Domingo, Francisco J. Arango y Parreño; estadista colonial

cubano, Edición del Centenario, Havana, 1937, p. 27.



*Translator's note: A reference to a line from Volver, a popular 1934

tango by Argentinian singer and composer Carlos Gardel and

lyricist Alfredo Lepera.



Published June 17 in Diario de Cuba



Source: "If the Model Isn't Working, What Hope Is There for the Copy? /

Dimas Castellanos | Translating Cuba" -

http://translatingcuba.com/if-the-model-isnt-working-what-hope-is-there-for-the-copy-dimas-castellanos/