Posted on Sat, May. 24, 2008
By JOSE AZEL
jazel@miami.edu
Since Raúl Castro's official ascension to power in February, the Cuban
government has been announcing changes to the country's economic model
with an increasing tempo. These changes have evoked a debate over
conflicting assessments of the significance of the Raulista changes.
Some Cuba observers view the changes as cosmetic and insignificant while
others argue that they are meaningful and transcendental particularly
within the context of Cuba's rarefied political and economic systems.
Seeking to label these changes as either inconsequential or truly
momentous would perhaps be the wrong analytical approach. We should
instead be asking two different questions. The first one relates to
motives: What are the current objectives of Raúl's regime? To answer
this question we should review the nature of the changes and the
statements and actions of the Cuban government. For starters, the
changes are mostly of an economic nature and seem designed to:
• Improve the domestic and international image of Raúl Castro and his
government.
• Remove some pervasive irritants and sources of complaints from the
population.
• Raise hard currency revenues by seeking to increase remittances from
the exile community worldwide.
• Better address some basic domestic needs by improving production and
productivity.
• Pressure the United States and the world community on
immigration-related matters.
There may very well be other motives, but the nature of the changes
announced so far do not suggest that structural political reforms in the
direction of democracy are imminent. A recent Granma editorial headlined
There will not be room for subversion in Cuba notes that the reforms
will strengthen socialism and will not lead to political changes sought
by ''adversaries, fifth columnists and internal mercenaries,'' referring
to domestic opponents. Similarly, the April 22 break-up of the peaceful
demonstration of the Women in White does not bode well for democracy in
Cuba.
At the same time that these measures are being introduced, Cuba is
moving to reinforce its monopolistic controls by annulling the licenses
of more than 150 foreign firms, prohibiting them from operating on the
island.
From all this it should be clear that, independent of how we may wish
to characterize the Raulista changes in the insignificant to
transcendental spectrum, Raúl Castro's goals do not include bringing
democracy to Cuba.
The second and most important question is Where will the changes lead?
Some have argued that by raising popular expectations Raúl is taking
significant risks and that events could get out of control resulting in
popular unrest. The Cuban government would then face one of two key
strategic options: Continue along the reform path by accelerating and
expanding the changes or retreat from the reforms and reestablish control.
An entirely different scenario is one in which the reforms succeed
economically and continue to progress, but without any parallel
political reforms. What then? Arguably, this has been the case in China
and Vietnam, where economic reforms have succeeded in increasing
prosperity but have not been followed by democratic pluralism. The
available evidence from these countries does not support the argument
that economic reforms in Cuba will lead inexorably to democracy. In
fact, the experiences of China and Vietnam support the contrarian
argument. After decades of economic reforms these countries are far from
democratic.
A likely scenario will be a criollo -- or home grown form of fraudulent
transition -- where Cuban communism ends with a transfer of the
country's wealth from the state to military officers and party officials
heading Cuba's military industrial-complex. A legitimate transition
requires the transparency provided by an infrastructure of democratic
institutions. Market-like economic reforms made without transparency by
the Cuban mandarins are more likely to result in their personal
financial gain than in democracy. This is simply because greed will be
the guiding principle without the oversight of an independent legal
system, a free press, and all the other self-governing regulatory
institutions that govern business activity in democratic free-market
societies.
Without democratic institutions in place, the Raulista reforms will in
time lead to a massive transfer of wealth under the camouflage of
market-reforms. In short, they will lead to a government focused on
extending the personal wealth of the ruling military/party elite at the
expense of the population: A government of thieves or what political
scientists label a kleptocracy. In this Cuban version of Ali Baba and
the Forty Thieves it will not be Morgiana who foils the plot, but only
the unwavering demand for political reforms by the international
community and Cubans themselves.
José Azel is a senior research associate at the Institute for Cuban and
Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami and an adjunct professor of
international business at UM's School of Business Administration.
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